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AGENCY RESPONSES TO NEPA:
A COMP ARISON AND IMPLICATIONS*
RICHARD N. L. ANDREWS**

INTRODUCTION

The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) has been
acclaimed as a Congressional mandate requiring all federal agencies,
whatever their traditional missions and responsibilities, to give in
creased consideration to the impacts of their actions upon the human
environment. 1 Five years have passed since NEPA was enacted, and
though much has been written about it, few studies have investigated
the response to the law by the various federal agencies. This paper
reports some findings of a study comparing two agencies engaged in
similar activities. 2
It is important to bear in mind the full content of NEPA to
evaluate its implementation, particularly since the detailed state
ments (environmental impact statements, or EIS's) it requires are
frequently discussed without reference to the purposes of the Act.
NEPA included three major elements: the declaration of a national
eavironmental policy; the establishment of a set of procedural re
quirements, including but not limited to the EIS; and the creation of
a Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) to advise the President
a,.1d oversee implementation of the Act. These elements were mu
tually supportive and interdependent. The procedures were not
intended to be treated as ends in themselves, but as action-forcing
provisions to compel implementation of the law's policy purposes. 3
Two fundamental criteria should be employed to evaluate agency
responses to the Act: the extent to which an agency has incorporated
*The research reported here was supported in part by a Resources Fellowship granted by
Resources for the Future, Inc. All opinions and conclusions, however, are the author's.
**Associate Professor of Natural Resource Policy, Univ. of Michigan.
1. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321, et seq. (1970).
2. For a full report of this research see R. Andrews, Environmental Policy and Admin
istrative Change (Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1972), to be published in
revised and updated form in July 1976 by D. C. Heath & Co. One other comparative
evaluation study is U.S. Council on Environmental Quality, An Evaluation of Implementa
tion and Administration of NEPA by the Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management
(Preliminary Report, February 1974). Fcir a general five-year overview of NEPA's imple
mentation see U.S. Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Quality-1974 ch. 4.
(1974).
3. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Sen. Rep. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st.
Sess., at 9 (July 9, 1969).
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the law's procedural requirements and the extent to which such
incorporation has led to outcomes consistent with NEPA's policy
goals.
Policies and procedures established by NEPA required consider
able interpretation to translate them into operational criteria for
administrative action, and this interpretive task was largely left to the
discretion of each agency and administrator. This discretion may
have been unavoidable in view of the wide range of actions and
administrative processes affected by the Act, but one consequence
was to permit great variation in response among and within federal
agencies. CEQ was made responsible for reviewing and appraising
implementation of the law and was authorized by executive order to
issue guidelines on the subject. 4 In practice CEQ merely issued guide
lines concerning the preparation of EIS's, leaving interpretation of the
law's substantive policy, other procedural duties, and certain ques
tions concerning the impact statements themselves to the operating
agencies.
It is instructive to compare the initial responses to this law of
federal agencies engaged in similar activities. Such comparison pro
vides insight into behavior patterns of agencies, and into the effec
tiveness of new legislative mandates in bringing about changes in
administrative behavior. This study compares two water resource
development programs, the Civil Works Program of the Army Corps
of Engineers and the Small Watersheds Program of the Soil Conserva
tion Service (SCS).
THE CORPS AND THE SOIL CONSERVATION SERVICE

The effectiveness of NEPA must ultimately be measured by its
ability to cut through intervening organizational and political vari
ables that shape the behavior of government agencies and influence
the substantive activities in which those agencies engage. The Corps
of Engineers and the Soil Conservation Service (SCS) differ in impor
tant aspects of their organization and political environment, but
engage in certain similar (and sometimes identical) activities. The
differences in environment and the similarities in activities must be
appreciated to understand each agency's ability to respond to NEPA.
The Corps is fundamentally an engineering agency whose mission
is the construction of public works projects. The construction of
water resource development projects is one of its principal activities,
4. NEPA, § 204(3) 42 U.S.C. § 4344 (1970); Executive Order No. 11514, March 5,
1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 4247. For a full evaluation of the Council see Liroff, The Council on
Environmental Quality, 3 Environmental L. Rep. 50051 (1973).

124

though it also carries out extensive military and post office constru
tion, military combat support, and other engineering functions. I
water resource engineering mandate originated in nineteenth centuryj
political pressures to use federal funds for internal improvements o
navigable water courses to foster economic development. Its profe
sional staff consists primarily of civil engineers, though in recent
years it has increased its representation of other relevant pro,,
fessions. 5 The staff of 30,000 consists overwhelmingly of civilians
who work under a military chain of command directed by approx.:
imately 250 engineer officers.
The Corps has broad options for shaping its program within the
general mission of civil works construction. It has a large budget
($1.3 billion in 1971 ), 60 per cent of which is devoted to actual.
construction, 6 and there are no limits on the size or costs of its
projects as long as the benefits, exceed the costs and Congress is
willing to fund them. The benefits may be calculated against a broad
range of authorized project purposes, including navigation, flood
control, hydroelectric power production, recreation, fish and wildlife,
enhancement and municipal water supply. 7 Corps projects may re
quire local cooperation, but the agency has much discretion in the•
planning, design, implementation and operation of its projects.
Finally, the Corps has great flexibility in the development and
execution of its activities as a result of its administrative and political
circumstances. It has almost complete administrative autonomy·
within the Department of Defense to carry out civil works functions,
since these activities are only remotely related to the central mission
of that Department. This autonomy is assured by strong support for
those functions in Congress and the fact that supervision is vested in··
Congressional committees which oversee public works rather than
military expenditures. The Corps has broad geographic flexibility,
permitting it to construct projects in any state or Congressional dis- ·
trict. Its constituency includes both urban and rural po)Julations,
accounting for its broad political appeal in Congress. The Corps ·
usually has a backlog of several hundred projects that have been
authorized but not yet funded. By obtaining Congressional approval,
it can easily adjust its priorities among these projects in response to
changing political demands. 8
5. Staff of the Senate Committee on Public Works, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. Civil Works
Program of the Corps of Engineers: A Report to the Secretary of the Army by the Civil
Works Study Board, at 21-23, 55-61 (Comm. Print 1966).
6. U.S. Office of Management and Budget, The Budget of the United States Government
Fiscal Year 1972, at 288-91 (1971).
7. Civil Works Program, supra note 5, at 24-38, 29-54, 62-63.
8. Id. at 62-63, 39-54.
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The Soil Conservation Service, in contrast, is not primarily an
engineering agency, and it differs significantly from the Corps in
important characteristics of its organization and political environ
ment. Its central historical mission is agricultural soil and water con
servation. SCS became involved in water management because of the
role water plays in soil conservation and because of the need for
conservation assistance for farmers during the Depression dust
bowls. 9 Conservation of these resources is still perceived as the
primary mission of the agency . 1 0 Other activities of SCS include soil
and snow surveys, land inventory and monitoring, plant testing for
conservation purposes, and technical and financial assistance in
conservation practices for cropland, pastures, woodland, wildlife, and
other soil-related resources. Represented on its professional staff are
a mixture of resource-related disciplines, including civil engineers.
SCS has a narrower range of options available to it than does the
Corps in planning and designing water resource projects. Its water
shed program budget is one-tenth the size of the Corps', and its
projects are limited by law in size and costs, requiring the agency to
defer to the Corps if action of greater magnitude becomes neces
sary. 1 1 The range of purposes authorized for SCS projects is nar
rower than for the Corps. SCS has no responsibility or authority in
the areas of navigation and hydroelectric power production, and
there are differences in the levels of permissible cost-sharing. SCS'
staff is one of the largest in the Department of Agriculture (15,000),
but only half the size of the Corps, and only a fraction of that staff is
engaged in water resource activities. Finally, the SCS water resource
program operates by means of technical and financial assistance to
local sponsoring organizations, and is constrained by the necessity of
arriving at a legal agreement mutually acceptable to the agency and
the local organization. 1 2 It therefore has less discretion than the
Corps in its choice of clients and in the development of projects.
Furthermore, its authority to implement and operate projects that it
finances is limited to ensuring that provisions of the work plan agree
ment are adhered to.
SCS does not have great autonomy within the Department of
9. See, e.g., A. Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New Deal ch. 20 (1958).
10. Hearings on Agriculture-Environmental and Consumer Protection Appropriations for
1974 Before the House Comm. on Appropriations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 146-271 (1973);
see also U.S. Department of Agriculture, Assistance Available from the Soil Conservation
Service, Agriculture Information Bulletin No. 345 (1970).
11. Hearings on Agriculture-Environmental . . . Appropriations, supra note 10, at
148-149; see also Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act, Public Law 83-566, 16
U.S.C. § § 1001-1008 as amended (Small Watershed Act).
12. Id
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Agriculture, since its water resource activities are viewed as one of
the Department's major sources of technical and financial aid for
farmers. Larger projects are subject to oversight by Congressional
public works committees, but all other activities fall under agricul
tu ral committees including agriculture appropriations subcom
mittees. SCS' access to diverse clienteles is limited by the agricultural
orientation of its principal activities and overseers, and by its low
visibility in urbanized areas from which many Congressmen are
elected.
While these two agencies differ in some organizational and polit
ical respects, their water resource development activities have impor
tant similarities. Both agencies impound streams behind dams and
line stream channels with concrete and it is reasonable to compare
the effects of NEPA's environmental policy mandate on the execu
tion of such environmental modifications. The purposes for which
these activities are carried out are also similar. While the Corps'
mission is broader, both build dam and channel projects with the
intent of providing flood damage reduction, municipal water supply,
recreation opportunities, and fish and wildlife habitat enhancement.
Finally, the criteria by which the two agencies' projects are justi
fied are identical and predicated upon economic benefits rather than
physical conservation objectives. 1 3 The fundamental mission of SCS
may be conservation of soil and water, but it justifies water resource
projects on the basis of economic benefits, as does the Corps, and its
budget for water resource projects represents nearly 40 per cent of
its annual appropriations. 1 4 It should not be assumed that SCS
projects are more consistent with environmental policy purposes
than projects proposed by the Corps because economic assistance to
farmers is no more inherently environmentally sound than economic
assistance to commerce and industry.
COMPARISON OF RESPONSES TO NEPA

The Corps and SCS both recognized that NEPA applied to their
water resource programs and took steps to implement the Act. They
differed in the extent and timing of those steps, in their treatment of
13. From 1962 until 197 3 both agencies were required to justify their proposed projects
using criteria established in Sen. Comm. on Public Works, Policies, Standards and Procedures
in the Formulation, Evaluation and Review of Plans for Use and Development of Water and
Related Land Resources, Sen. Doc. No. 87-97, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1962). In 1973 these
were superseded by U.S. Water Resource Council, Principles and Standards for Planning
Water and Related Land Resources, 38 Fed. Reg. 24778 (1973). The latter document
loosened in principle the emphasis of the former upon economic measures, but it has not
yet been fully implem�nted.
14. Hearings on Agriculture-Environmental ... Appropriations, supra note 10, at 148.
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projects underway, and in their openness to the public involvement
mandate of NEPA. Despite these differences, both agencies' re
sponses were directed primarily to NEPA's procedures rather than its
substantive policy goals, and both were motivated by external
political pressures rather than commitment by agency administrators
to NEPA's objectives.
Implementation of NEPA 's Policy
The Corps interpreted NEPA as a mandate to be reflected on its
plans and decisions, while SCS, at least until 1974, interpreted it as a
reiteration of its existing objectives.
The Corps took the position that NEPA created a new criterion
for federal action, authorizing it to consider a broader range of
effects than had been considered previously. It directed recognition
of environmental quality as a new objective for planning,1 5 and
requested funds and personnel to carry out its new responsibilities. 1 6
According to the testimony of the Corps' Director of Civil Works:
It wasn't until the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act
that we really had in our hands the authority to spend money, time
and effort in this field over and above what were the precedent
setting studies in which economic development and the benefit-cost
ratio were the be-all-and-end-all. 1 7

SCS, in contrast, interpreted NEPA as a reinforcement of its pre
vious missions and policies. For at least two years after NEPA's
enactment it directed no change in the range of considerations enter
ing into its water resource planning process and requested no new
funds or personnel to carry out the mandate of NEPA. Proponents
and critics of water resource projects agree that traditional criteria
narrowly focused on economic development, yet only the Corps
interpreted NEPA as broadening those criteria and recognized the
law's mandate for increased attention to noneconomic measures of
environmental quality. Until 1974 SCS's policy was that NEPA
"reinforces the mission of the Soil Conservation Service. " 1 8
15. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Engineer Circular (hereinafter EC) 1165-2-83, March
3, 1970; EC 1165-2-86, April, 30, 1970; and EC 1165-2-500, November 30, 1970, Environ
mental Guidelines for the Civil Works Program of the Corps of Engineers.
16. See Hearings on Public Works for Water and Power Development and Atomic Energy
Commission Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1972 Before the Sen. Comm. on Public Works,

92nd Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 1 (1971).
17. Testimony of Major General Frank P. Koisch, Hearings on Stream Channelization
Before the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 2, at 556, 580
(1971).
18. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Soil Conservation Service, at 2-3, Mar. 19, 1971; see
also U.S. Congress, Hearings on Red Tape Before the House Comm. on Public Works, 92nd
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In a general sense NEPA reinforces the mission of conserving soil
and water and demands precisely the sort of harmonious relationship
between human activities and their biological and physical resource
base that SCS was established to achieve. But in taking this policy
position, SCS ignored the crucial differences between the physical
conservation mission of the agency as a whole and the fundamental
economic mission of its Small Watershed Program. It failed to take
the position of policy leadership in implementing NEPA that might
have been expected of it.
Moreover, SCS failed to recognize conflict between policy and
procedures established by NEPA and the isolated pursuit of any
single mission-even soil conservation. SCS has a tradition of exper
tise in agricultural soil erosion and runoff, but admits to little
experience in such closely related topics as water quality, erosion and
sediment transport characteristics of streams, downstream and
ground water effects of stream channelization, and the effects of its
actions on water quality, fish, wildlife habitat, and wetland produc
tivity . 1 9 NEPA provided an opportunity for SCS significantly to
broaden the range of its concerns, but the agency chose instead to
interpret the Act as a reinforcement of its normal activities.
In 1974 SCS guidelines for implementation of NEPA finally
reinterpreted the agency's own mission to give equal weight to three
related goals:
I) Quality in the natural resource base for sustained use;
2) Quality in environment to provide attractive, convenient, and
satisfying places to live, work and play; and
3) Quality in the standard of living based on community improve
ment and adequate income. 20

With these guidelines SCS recognized the necessity of redefining
its mission more broadly to fulfill the purposes of NEPA. At approx
imately the same time, SCS inaugurated intensive and reportedly
outstanding ecological training programs for staff members, pro
jected to include more than 400 individuals from key positions
throughout the organization. 2 1
Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 92-15, at 217 (1971); Environment Memorandum 1 (Revised), Decem
ber 11, 1971, 36 Fed. Reg. 23674.
19. For testimony see SCS, Questions and Answers with respect to Watershed Program
Activities prepared by SCS Watershed Group, August 1971. Reprinted in Hearings on
Agriculture-Environmental . .. Appropriations, supra note 10, at 344-380.
20. 39 Fed. Reg. 19646 et seq., June 3, 1974.
21. Staff members of the Council on Environmental Quality praised these training pro
grams in conversations with the author.
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Implementation of NEPA 's Procedures
The Corps responded immediately and affirmatively to NEPA's
procedural requirements, particularly that of environmental impact
statements, and made early and sustained policy commitments to
their implementations. SCS, in contrast, sought to avoid these re
quirements for two or three years, and not until 1973 and 1974 did
its procedures approach the level of implementation previously
attained by the Corps.
The Corps provided detailed instructions for procedural imple
mentation to its field offices in April and September 1970 and May
1971, and reinforced these with a series of supplementary directives.
The instructions contained discussions of problems noted by the
Washington office concerning EIS's submitted from the field, increas
ingly detailed specification of the procedures to be followed in
implementing NEPA, the environmental impacts to be considered,
and repeated emphasis on new policies adopted by the Corps in its
official response to NEPA. 2 2 Other instructions followed, and thor
ough revisions were issued in February 1973 and again in April
1974.2 3 By 1974 the Corps' guidelines were still exemplary among
federal agencies, they required integrated assessment of social, eco
nomic, and environmental impacts, coordination with other agencies
and citizens throughout the planning of projects, development of
alternatives weighted toward environmental protection and enhance
ment, and environmental analyses as detailed as engineering, eco
nomic, and other studies.
SCS displayed far less progress in its implementation of NEPA's
procedures during this period. One general policy memorandum was
issued in May 1970; specific instructions were not issued until March
and April 1971. These later instructions merely restated the language
of the Act without elaboration.2 4 No suggestions to improve ad
mittedly deficient EIS's were issued nor were changes in environ
mental standards ordered. 2 5
Not until mid-1972 were important new changes issued. At that
time SCS personnel were directed to perform an environmental
inventory during the first pre-planning environmental reconnaissance
22. EC 1165-2-83 (March 3, 1970); EC 1165-2-86 (April 30, 1970); ENGCW-C M/1 (June
2, 1970); EC 1120-2-56 (September 25, 1970); EC 1165-2-500 (November 30, 1970); and
ER 1105-2-507 (May 28, 1971); 36 Fed. Reg. 11309 (June 11, 1971).
23. 38 Fed. Reg. 9242 (Feb1uary 16, 1973); 39 Fed. Reg. 12737 (April 8, 1974).
24. Soil Conservation Service, Watersheds Memorandum 103 (May 1, 1970); Environ
ment Memorandum 1 (March 19, 1971); Watershed Protection Handbook Notice 1-17
(April 7, 1971).
25. See Hearings on Administration of NEPA Before House Comm. on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries, 91st. Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. 1, at 985 (1970).
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study, to present all feasible alternatives (including objectives which
differed from those of local project sponsors) in the impact state
ment, to conduct a public information meeting on the preliminary
investigation report, and to append to the final EIS copies of all
substantive letters of comment submitted on the draft statement.
They were also instructed to prepare EIS's for all stream channel
excavation projects that might have significant environmental
impacts. 2 6 Instructions similar to these, and in most cases more
detailed, had been given to Corps personnel a year earlier in May
1971. Corps procedures were available to SCS, and there is evidence
of direct pressure on SCS during and after 1971 from CEQ to im
prove policies and procedures. 2 7 Evidently SCS deliberately chose
not to move as far or as fast as the Corps during this period.
Between 1972 and 1974, SCS' procedural guidelines underwent
sweeping revision, and by 1974 they were comparable to those of the
Corps. Among the changes made were requirements that collection
of data for the EIS begin simultaneously with preparation of the
project application; that cumulative and regional impacts be con
sidered along with impacts on historical, social, and economic values;
and that SCS field offices take an active role to ensure broad public
access to planning and decision processes. 2 8 In June 1973 SCS issued
a lengthy advisory memorandum, which commented in detail on
deficiencies in earlier impact statements and recommended specific
corrective measures. Then in 197 4 the agency issued for trial use an
"Environmental Assessment Procedure" to assist its field staff in
preparing the substance of EIS's. 2 9
The changes in SCS guidelines between 1972 and 197 4 repre
sented a major shift in posture toward implementation of NEPA's
procedures. SCS documents prior to 1972 reflected a desire to avoid
NEPA's procedures rather than to interpret and apply them. SCS
instructions from 1972 on, in contrast, demonstrated a symbolic
commitment to embrace and implement these procedures. Signif
icantly, CEQ testified in 1974 that the impact statements produced
by the Corps of Engineers were the best among federal agencies, and
those of SCS were among the most improved. 3 0
26. Watershed Protection Handbook Notice 1-19, May 24, 1972.
27. Letter dated December 15, 1970, from Mr. Timothy Atkeson (CEQ) to Dr. T. C.
Byerly (U.S.D.A.). Quoted in Hearings on Stream Channelization, supra note 17, at 392.
28. See Environment Memoranda 9, 10, 12, and 13 (all 1972); and 39 Fed. Reg. 19646
et seq. (June 3, 1974).
29. Soil Conservation Service, Advisory WS-26 (June 25, 1973); Soil Conservation
Service, Environmental Assessment Procedure, May 1974.
30. Hearings on Agriculture-Environmental and Consumer Protection Appropriations for
1973 Before House Comm. on Appropriations, Pt. 5, at 944 (1974).
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Application of NEPA to Previously Authorized Projects
The agencies differed in their treatment of projects authorized or
planned prior to the law's enactment. NEPA contained no grand
father clause exempting such projects from its requirements, and
required an EIS whenever any major federal action remained to be
taken. The Corps and SCS applied this test in quite different ways.
The Corps directed that EIS's be prepared by its field offices for
all projects on which any major federal action remained to be taken
and that any doubt be resolved in favor of preparing the statement.
While not directing that these statements include substantive review
of the projects' merits in light of NEPA's policy goals, the Corps did
require that EIS's be prepared and made public in fulfillment of the
letter of the Act. As a result, by the end of 1971 the Corps had
submitted 435 statements to CEQ, far more than any other agency
except the Department of Transportation. 3 1
SCS, in contrast, directed that EIS's be prepared for partially
planned projects on a case-by-case basis, leaving great discretion to
field officials to weigh the costs and benefits of doing so. In practice
this meant that while the Corps and SCS each had between 1,000
and 1,200 backlogged projects at the time of NEPA's enactment,
SCS had prepared only 87 detailed statements on water projects by
the end of 1971 in contrast to the Corps' 435. 3 2
While it prepared far fewer impact statements, SCS did order a
substantive review of all projects that involved stream channelization.
These amounted to two-thirds of its authorized projects at the time
of the directive in February 1971, which stated that NEPA was the
primary basis for this review. 3 3 Stream channelization projects were
virtually the only category of SCS actions that aroused concern
about environmental impacts, so this directive amounted to a review
of all SCS activities that were environmentally controversial at the
time. Unfortunately, no new criteria were established to reflect
NEPA's purposes. Channelization was still to be used to permit the
profitable use of flood plains, though serious consideration should be
given to nonstructural alternatives. No explicit relationship was
established between this review and the detailed statement require
ment. The purpose of the review was to group channelization
projects into three categories: those with none, some, and serious
environmental impacts. The categorization was to be accomplished
31. EC 1165-2-83 (March 3, 1970); U.S. Council on Environmental Quality, I 102
Monitor No. 12, at 66.
32. Soil Conservation Service, Environment Memorandum 1 at 4-5 (March 19, 1971);
Council on Environmental Quality I 102 Monitor No. 12, at 66.
33. Soil Conservation Service, Watersheds Memorandum 108 (February 4, 1971).
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with the participation of fish and wildlife agencies, but in practice
there were significant differences of opinion between the agencies
concerning appropriate classification of many projects. In some cases
these classifications permitted evasion of the procedures established
by NEPA. 34
The Corps sought to ensure that its actions subsequent to the
enactment of NEPA were procedurally in compliance with the Act,
while SCS sought to avoid involving itself with NEPA's procedures
but substantively reviewed the one category of actions considered
environmentally controversial. The difference is important, since
NEPA's procedures were intended to be the action-forcing mechan
ism which would ensure implementation of its policy goals. The
Corps' approach imposed a heavy paperwork burden on its staff and
generated a substantial number of superficial documents, but did
force a learning process throughout the organization by necessitating
that NEPA-related questions be considered in conjunction with pro
gram decisions. The SCS' approach was less burdensome, but it
evaded the educational process of writing EIS's and focused on
environmental controversiality rather than environmental impacts as
the implicit criterion for reassessment of its activities. In view of
their histories and missions, SCS may not have needed the environ
mental education process as badly as the Corps. In any case, SCS did
not initially use the detailed statement requirement to stimulate such
a process.
Public Involvement
The Corps' policy statements and guidelines linked preparation of
impact statements to procedures for early and repeated public in
volvement in project planning, including active solicitation of com
ments at early stages in its administrative processes. SCS, in fOntrast,
encouraged a flow of information about proposed projects from local
sponsoring organizations to the public, but until 1974 did not itself
take an active role in soliciting public comments, nor did it en
courage or permit early public review of EIS's.
The Corps delegated responsibility for the preparation, public
disclosure, and defense of EIS's to its District Engineers and required
that these actions precede submission of recommendations to
34. NEPA's EIS requirement could be evaded by striking bargains with fish and wildlife
agencies concerning project design and mitigation measures, following which the projects
could be redefined as having no significant environmental impacts and thus not requiring
preparation of an impact statement. The danger in this practice was that other agencies and
the public were not necessarily parties to these discussions, and thus non-fish and wildlife
impacts that might be identified from an EIS might never surface.
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Washington. It also emphasized the necessity of integrating environ
mental assessment into all phases of planning. 3 5 Corps guidelines
stressed early and continuous liaison with interested sectors of the
public to raise and resolve potential objections as early as possible,
and ordered that multiple public meetings and other vehicles for such
liaison be utilized during the course of planning. The agency's policy
is captured succinctly in the testimony of its Director of Civil Works
in December 1970: "We want [potential controversies] out just as
soon as we can get them out." 3 6
SCS required local sponsors to disseminate information to the
public throughout the project planning, and beginning in mid-1972
required that a first public meeting be held at the completion of the
preliminary investigation report. This meeting was to include discus
sion of tentative agreements reached by the sponsors and SCS con
cerning potential alternatives. However, SCS guidelines treated the
public information provision as primarily a one-way process to be
initiated after tentative agreements had been reached, rather than as
an active solicitation of public preferences and objections. Moreover,
the guidelines defined this information process as the responsibility
of the sponsoring organization, not SCS. Finally, the impact state
ment was to be made public only at the final stage of project review
formalities, after tentative agreement had been reached on a final
work plan and after Washington had reviewed the plan and the
EIS. 3 7 Not until issuance of the 1973 and 1974 guideline revisions
did SCS direct that draft impact statements be prepared and made
public in the field, and that SCS officials actively seek out and in
volve four different categories of publics in their planning and deci
sion processes. 3 8
Procedural Versus Substantive Changes

The actions that both agencies took in response to NEPA focused
on the Act's procedural requirements rather than its policy goals,
particularly on procedures for preparation of EIS's. However, signif
icant differences were evident between the two agencies' water re
source programs and priorities during the period; these differences
35. EC 1165-2-86 (April 30, 1970).
36. Hearings on Administration of NEPA, supra note 25, at 926 (testimony of Major
General Frank P. Koisch). See also the remarks of Lt. General F. J. Clarke, Chief of
Engineers, quoted in EC 1165-2-100 (May 28, 1971), Public Participation in Water Resource
Planning.
37. Watershed Protection Handbook Notice 1-17, April 7, 1971, § § 113.132(b),
113.133, 113.1331, 113.1332.
38. 39 Fed. Reg. 19646 et seq. June 3, 1974.
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must be noted though they may have been only indirectly influenced
by NEPA.
The guidlines of both the Corps and SCS were confined primarily
to implementation of the detailed statement requirement of NEPA.
Neither agency provided formal guidance for compliance with
Section 102(2)(B), which required the development of procedures
and methods for giving appropriate consideration to unquantifiable
values. Nor was there guidance concerning the applicability of the
law's policy goals such as preservation of diversity, achieving balance
between population and resource use, enhancing the quality of
renewable resources, and maximizing recycling of depletable
resources. The water resource activities of the Corps' and SCS have
important implications for the achievement of such goals, yet efforts
of both agencies, as well as of CEQ, reflected a strong preoccupation
with the detailed statement procedure rather than with the law as a
whole.
Available evidence suggests that few substantive changes in pro
posed water projects were made by either agency as a direct conse
quence of NEPA. In the case of the Corps, survey responses in late
1971 indicated that less than one-fifth of the projects for which
impact statements had been prepared (six per cent of authorized
projects) had been affected in any substantive way as a result of
NEPA. In more than 60 per cent of these cases the effect was listed
as postponement rather than cancellation or significant change. 3 9
Similar survey responses from SCS indicated substantive effects on
approximately six per cent of its authorized watershed planning
processes. In two-thirds of these cases the effect was identified
simply as a postponement. It is possible that these percentages would
increase as agency efforts gradually turned to projects less fully
planned at the inception of NEPA, yet such changes would have to
be attributed increasingly to intervening variables rather than the
specific influence of the Act. Changes in the agencies that were
specifically attributable to NEPA were primarily procedural.
Despite similar preoccupation with NEPA's procedures and the
similar paucity of substantive changes in their projects, important
differences were evident in the two agencies' overal programmatic
priorities during this period.
While the Corps did not renounce its traditional engineering
39. Survey questionnaires were mailed to all District Engineers of the Corps and all State
Conservationists of the SCS in October 1971, asking a series of questions concerning effort
and cost devoted to preparation of impact statements, effects of NEPA on planned actions,
and other dimensions of response to NEPA. Responses were received from 75 to 90 per cent
of the individuals surveyed, depending on the question.
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activities, it did initiate significant program changes between 1972
and 1974. One was a pilot program of environmental reconnaissance
inventories intended to develop and synthesize information on sig
nificant environmental and resource values on a statewide or district
wide basis. Another was a proposal to use strictly nonstructural
measures (specifically, the purchase of flood plain lands) in three
projects, a proposal which was subsequently approved by Congress in
1973. 40 A third was a new program of urban studies which grew
from five pilot wastewater management studies to studies in more
than 26 urban areas within one year. More than one-third of the
agency's total study funds for fiscal year 1974 were devoted to this
program.
Though these programs were experimental rather than central to
the Corps' activities, the depth and rapidity of its plunge into urban
water quality studies suggested the possibility that a major new
mission for the Corps was in the making. Realizing that an increasing
ly urban population might oppose its traditional flood control
projects, the agency was astute enough to seek authority for popular
activities and to tum some of its engineering skills from rural dam
construction or urban wastewater management.
SCS, in contrast, showed virtually no signs of change in the pri
orities of its water resource program during this period, and in fact
the agency congratulated itself during its budget hearings each year
because it was setting new records for water project construction
during an era of environmental concerns. 4 1 SCS testimony indicates
deliberate avoidance of environmentally controversial projects in
setting agency priorities, but no change in traditional purposes,
clients, or types of water resource activities comparable to those of
the Corps. 4 2
40. Water Resource Development Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. § l 962d-5c (Supp. IV, 1974).
41. Hearings on Agriculture ... Appropriations for 1974, supra note 10, at 192, 278,
328,419; Hearings on Agriculture . .. Appropriations for 1973, Pt. 2, at 360, 416, 430.
42. Hearings on Agriculture . ..Appropriations for 1974, supra note 10, at Hearings,
Part 2, pp. 392-393. It is important to note that the reasons for this posture did not
necessarily lie within the agency. Significantly, SCS was given authority by two laws enacted
in 1972 and 1973 to broaden its program (and potentially to shift its priorities), including
such activities as flood plain purchase, land use inventory and monitoring, water quality
management, and other environmental enhancement activities. See, the Water Resource
Development Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. § 1962d-5c (Supp. IV 1974); and the Rural Develop
ment Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 3122 (Supp. IV 1974). By the end of 1974, however, it still
had not been delegated the authority or provided with funds to implement these activities.
Several political considerations may help to explain this circumstance, but a central one
appears to be the continuing commitment of the chairman of the House Agricultural
Appropriation Subcommittee, who was also an author of the Small Watersheds Act, to
keeping SCS' water resources program as primarily a program of technical and financial
assistance to farmers.
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Changes in the Corps' program were due only in part to the influ
ence of NEPA, and the lack of change in SCS' water program
demonstrates that NEPA did not effectively compel such changes. It
is likely, however, that changes were made more feasible by the
existence of NEPA and the forces it set in motion. The extent to
which such influence occurred is probably of far greater consequence
than the limited changes in specific projects and procedures.
The crucial difference between the Corps and SCS on this count is
that the Corps was able to view NEPA entrepreneurially as an
opportunity for change rather than as a threat, while SCS was not
able to do so.

Causes of Change
Available evidence suggests that political pressures from sources
external to each agency were principal forces driving the implementa
tion of NEPA, but that the sources and mixture of such pressures
differed. In the case of the Corps these pressures were strong, reason
ably unified and emanated principally from the vanguard of the
environmental movement and the courts. Political pressures on SCS
from the environmental movement were weaker. Only a handful of
lawsuits were initiated against the SCS, and these were neutralized by
counterpressure from the agency's traditional supporters in Congress.
The only concerted pressures on SCS came from the fish and wildlife
agencies and their constituencies, traditional foes of SCS' stream
channelization programs, who seized on NEPA's interagency review
requirements as a tactical instrument of opposition to those activ
ities.
The Corps was subjected to immediate and continuing pressures to
implement NEPA. From the nature of its activities and its symbolic
position as the federal government's principal engineering agency, it
could not doubt that it would be a principal target of environmental
interest groups. It was sued for noncompliance with NEPA six times
within eight months after the law's enactment and lost at least eight
such lawsuits by the end of 1971. 4 3 It was sued repeatedly there
after, and while certain general boundaries in court rulings were
evident by 1973, the threat and reality of extensive litigation effec
tively placed pressure on the Corps to comply at least procedurally
with NEPA.
Survey responses from Corps officials attributed nearly three
quarters of all NEPA-related decisions to cancel, postpone, or change
projects to pressures from outside the federal government. These
43. See F. Anderson, NEPA in the Courts (1973}.
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included adverse state or local review, public controversy, or judicial
decisions. Interestingly, few decisions significantly to change projects
were attributed to judicial decisions, but an overwhelming propor
tion of all projects affected by NEPA in any substantive way were
located in districts that had been subjected to at least one NEPA-re
lated lawsuit.4 4 A similar disproportion was evident in the estimates
of effort devoted to the preparation of EIS's.4 5 These findings
suggest that lawsuits may have had indirect beneficial consequences
considerably greater than their modest effectiveness in challenging
specific projects.
The Soil Conservation Service, in contrast, was not subjected to
overwhelming pressures to implement NEPA. The first NEPA lawsuit
was not initiated against the SCS until late 1971. 46 While by 1974 it
had been defeated on several procedural issues in that particular case
involving the Chicod Creek watershed in eastern North Carolina, it
had been sued only half a dozen times and did not lose a second case
until early 1975. Its only politically controversial practice was stream
channelization, an activity which various fish and wildlife agencies
and several Congressional committees were attempting to stop. But
this was a long-standing battle in which NEPA simply provided a new
tactical weapon rather than a new political force.4 7 Unlike the
Corps, SCS could point to its conservation label and to the fact that
most of its activities were not environmentally controversial. Insofar
as Congressional pressures were concerned, its own oversight commit
tees were both solidly in favor of the use of channelization and
powerful enough to defeat any pressure that the Conservation and
fish and wildlife committees were attempting to generate.4 8
44. Twenty-seven per cent of the districts responding had been sued at least once, but
100 per cent of the projects cancelled, 58 per cent of those postponed, 35 per cent of those
significantly changed, and 55 per cent of all projects in these three categories were located
in these districts.
45. Districts that had been sued reported a mean of 11 per cent more effort (median nine
per cent) for noncontroversial projects and 32 per cent more effort (median 42 per cent) for
controversial projects than districts not sued.
46. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. N. C. 1972).
The Chicod Creek project.
47. See Hearings on Stream Channelization, supra note 17, a lengthy series of hearings
held by the Subcommittee on Conservation and Natural Resources of the House Committee
on Government Operations, chaired by Rep. Henry Reuss. Parallel hearings were held in thy
Senate. Even in the NEPA oversight hearings in December 1970 (Hearing5 on Administra
tion of NEPA, supra note 25), virtually all questioning of SCS centered on its authority to
require fish and wildlife enhancement measures rather than on its implementation of NEPA
per se. These hearings were held by the Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conserva
tion of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, chaired by Rep. John
Dingell. This committee was the House sponsor of NEPA, but apparently was more con
cerned with a particular traditional battle in its questioning of the SCS.
48. Rep. Reuss' efforts to withhold funding of channelization projects were defeated;
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Survey responses from SCS officials indicated that external
pressures played a lesser role in affecting projects than in the case of
the Corps. Such pressures reportedly influenced only 40 per cent of
project postponements by SCS, as opposed to nearly three-quarters
of all NEPA-related project modifications by the Corps. Obviously,
judicial decisions played no role at all during the period prior to the
survey, since none had yet been issued. There is at least circum
stantial evidence, however, that the Chicod Creek decision against
the SCS in early 1972 may have helped bring about the subsequent
series of reversals in SCS policy mentioned above.
Interestingly, the dominant force influencing NEPA-related proj
ect changes by SCS was comments by other federal agencies, com
bined with SCS internal reevaluation or nonfederal pressures. Such
comments were the most frequently reported cause of project post
ponements and the second most frequently reported cause of signif
icant changes in projects. This finding tends to confirm that pressures
on SCS originated primarily with the federal fish and wildlife agency
and its constituencies rather than with the vanguard of the new
environmental movement that was pressuring the Corps. 4 9

Similarities in Response
In highlighting differences between the agencies' responses it is
important to keep in mind their substantial similarities in other
respects. Few clear differences could be discerned, for instance, in
the average quality of the EIS's submitted by the Corps and SCS
during this period, although the Corps' best statements were dis
tinctly more sophisticated than any prepared by SCS. There was
little difference in the total number of project postponements or
changes reported by field officials of each agency, though they ·
attributed these changes to different factors. Finally, though Corps
policies appeared more enlightened than those of SCS, in practice it
does not appear to have enforced these policies systematically, and
many extremely superficial EIS's were merely approved and passed
along rather than returned to the field for improvement. These
similarities suggest caution in attempting sweeping conclusions from
the contrasts, though they do not diminish the importance of the
differences themselves.
and the red tape hearings, supra note 18, were held by the Public Works Committee at the
same time as the stream channelization hearings. They were used by the SCS Watersheds
Administrator as a platform for complaints about Reuss' efforts. See, e.g., Hearings on Red
Tape, supra note 18, at 217-18.
49. Federal agency comments were cited by SCS state conservationists among the causes
of 48 per cent of the postponements and 27 per cent of the "significant changes."
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EXPLANATION OF RESPONSES

How might the differences between the two agencies' responses to
NEPA best be explained? Three different explanations might be
attempted; one interpreting agency behavior as that of rational actors
pursuing different objectives, a second attributing behavior to
differences in organizational characteristics, and a third emphasizing
differences in the political pressures operating on them. 5 0 No one is
complete in itself, but taken together they offer what appears to be a
reasonably detailed picture.
Objectives
Differences in program objectives do not explain variations in
agency responses to NEPA since the two water programs showed
similarity in their objectives and criteria for water resource develop
ment actions. SCS' range of authorized purposes is narrower than
that of the Corps, but there is no reason why it could not have used
NEPA (as the Corps did) as a lever to broaden that field of purposes.
Differences in agency objectives provide a better explanation, one
particularly appealing to supporters of SCS. SCS is a conservation
agency, the Corps an engineering one; it is not surprising that they
should respond differently to NEPA. Yet the direction of response is
the opposite of what one might expect, with the Corps appearing to
lead the federal government in implementation of the law and SCS
lagging several years behind. One would have expected SCS to take
an early and strong role in interpreting and implementing NEPA
because the Act's mandate was closely related (though not identical)
to its. traditional mission. NEPA could have provided SCS with a
broad lever for conservation of the physical environment to use
against the shortsighted economic criteria of other agencies. Sim
ilarly, one would expect the Corps to dig in its heels and resist a
mandate so divergent from its traditional mission and practices. As
this study demonstrates, however, the opposite occurred.
Organizational Characteristics
An analysis of the differences between the agencies as bureaucratic
organizations leads to another promising explanation. Arguably the
Corps was more responsive to NEPA because it is a larger and more
autonomous agency, and its broad range of activities permits flex
ibility to change priorities without threat to organizational survival.
Moreover, it builds larger projects whose budgets can more easily
accommodate the expense of additional environmental studies.
50. These three approaches loosely follow Allison; see G. Allison, Essence of Decision:
Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (1971).

140

These organizational characteristics help explain several observed
differences between the agencies' responses to NEPA, but leave other
important questions unanswered. Why did the agencies differ so
sharply for four years in applying NEPA's policy to their water
resource activities? Why did SCS identify environmental impacts
primarily as affecting fish and wildlife, while the Corps adopted a
more holistic approach to the environment? And why did the agen
cies display such divergent attitudes towards public involvement?
These differences are not explained by organizational characteristics
alone, though such characteristics undoubtedly played an important
contributory role in the overall pattern of agency behavior and re
sponse.
Political Pressures
In confronting these questions, a plausible explanation emerges
from a comparison of the sets of competing pressures in each
agency's political environment. Differences in the mixtures of these
political pressures did exist during the period studied, and were per
ceived as being different by responsible field officials of the two
agencies.
The Corps was the subject of numerous attacks during this period
by ad hoc coalitions and groups in the vanguard of the new environ
mental movement, and the pressures brought were converted into
credible threats by unprecedented numbers of injunctions granted
against Corps projects by the federal judiciary. The Corps was also
subjected to widespread notoriety in the press as a central political
symbol of the callous modification of natural environments and was
vulnerable (despite the vaunted political strength of its beneficiaries'
lobby) to changes in the attitudes and preferences of the general
public. It appears there was sympathy for the Corps' image problem
in key quarters, including its Congressional oversight committees and
the Office of Management and Budget. As a result it was permitted
occasionally to take costly and unprecedented measures in response.
These measures included making new studies, hiring personnel,
involvement in urban programs, and flood plain acquisition.
SCS appears to have been insulated from the pressures of
opponents through this period by its lower profile with the environ
mental movement and the aggressive protection of its Congressional
overseers. SCS did not initially have the image problem that the
Corps did because it was a smaller and more rural agency, less visible
to the predominantly urban and suburban constituents of the envi
ornmental movement. Also, its engineering activities were less
obvious under the broad umbrella of soil conservation. Perhaps as a
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result, it was not authorized to make costly or innovative changes in
response to the law.
SCS eventually developed an image problem as the press and
Congress began investigating stream channelization, but this problem
was limited to that category of activities rather than the mission of
the agency as a whole, and political forces were not united even
against this activity. In contrast, its Congressional oversight com
mittees pressed actively and effectively for the continuation of its
traditional activities, including channelization. Not until I 972, and
more forcefully in I 974, did SCS change its posture towards NEPA.
This occurred after its first defeat in a NEPA lawsuit, the retirement
of its outspokenly traditionalist watershed administrator, and the
settling of boundaries of acceptable response to NEPA by other
agencies including the Corps.
CONCLUSION

It appears that NEPA did force action by the federal water re
source agencies, but that it did so in different ways and with varying
degrees of effectiveness. Both organizational characteristics and
political pressures were of major significance in determining the
magnitude, speed, and character of the agencies' responses.
First, even in the agencies' official policies and guidelines, signif
icant differences in interpretation could and did occur. Though pub
lic positions do not provide complete indications of agency behavior,
since they may be reinforced or contradicted by other factors (such
as budgetary decisions, vigor of enforcement, or attitudinal differ
ences among field officials), they do demonstrate the crucial role
played by administrative discretion in the implementation of legisla
tive directives.
Second, implementation of NEPA's procedures did not alone force
implementation of NEPA's policy goals. The evidence presented
indicates that during the first few years, NEPA's procedures were
implemented largely without reference to its substantive purposes.
The agencies acted in the context of sharply divergent interpretations
of the relationship between the Act's policy and their own dam
construction and stream channel excavation activities. One agency
perceived the law as a strategic opportunity, the other as a tactical
threat; both concentrated principally on procedures rather than on
policy goals.
Third, the environmental impact statement has proved to be not a
single action-forcing mechanism, but the pivotal document of three
such mechanisms which operate in different ways on different
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agencies. These mechanisms are internal review as the EIS accom
panies action proposals upward through the initiating agency, inter
agency circulation of the EIS for review and comment by affected
federal agencies, and publication of the statement to nongovern
mental individuals and interest groups for review.
Each mechanism has played an important role in influencing
implementation of NEPA. The first serves an educational function,
forcing the consideration of new questions in project planning and
providing a new warning system for potential controversies. The
second provides a new instrument in old bureaucratic battles and a
source of information to agency officials concerning actions poten
tially in conflict with their own. 5 1 The third provides a short-term
tactic for redistributing access to federal decisionmaking processes,
for delaying (though rarely stopping) federal action proposals, and
for indirectly forcing fuller implementation of NEPA's procedures.
Fourth, the last of these mechanisms, EIS review by nongovern
mental individuals and groups, was accompanied by the threat of ad
hoc involvement and legal action. This made it the most effective
action-forcing mechanism contributing to NEPA implementation
during this initial period. It is not clear whether this mechanism is a
force that can sustain its effectiveness indefinitely, but no agencies
have made substantial efforts to implement NEPA in the absence of
effective external pressures to do so.
Despite these initial conclusions, the long-term implications of the
agencies' responses to NEPA during this period are unclear. Litiga
tion was an important tactic in the short run, but its effectiveness
was limited to actions opposed by financially able and politically
sophisticated plaintiffs. Its effectiveness over a longer period might
be limited by the unwillingness of the courts to substitute their
judgments for those of the agencies on substantive matters, once
standards for procedural compliance have been established satisfac
torily. One perennial possibility is that Congress will weaken NEPA's
requirements by amendment. 5 2
It is conceivable that some, if not most, of the effectiveness of
51. For the value of such statements to state agencies, see M. Hufschmidt, Environmental
Statements and Water Resource Planning in North Carolina (Water Resources Research
Institute of the University of North Carolina, June 1974, Report No. 94).
52. By the end of 1974 such efforts had succeeded in a small number of specific in
stances, e.g., emergency licensing of nuclear power plants, exemption of water quality
permit activities of EPA, construction of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System, and a few
others. But no general amendments to NEPA had yet been enacted despite several cam
paigns to do so. See U.S. Congress, Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969: An Analysis of Proposed Legislative Modifications-First
Session, 93rd Congress (Comm. Print 1973), prepared by the Environmental Policy Division
of the Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress.
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political pressures by environmentalists was a short-run phenomenon
and not indicative of genuine shifts in the agencies' priorities. NEPA
has not changed the legal relationships between agencies and their
clients, nor has it altered the natural communities of interest
between construction agencies, such as the Corps, and their benefi
ciaries in the construction. industry. The Act has not overturned
long-term forces such as organizing costs that tend selectively to
favor producer over consumer interests in the political process, 5 3 nor
has it altered the structure of Congressional committees responsible
for oversight of agencies with development missions which are still
disproportionately populated by advocates of those missions. Pro
grammatic changes that did occur during this period were partly
influenced by NEPA, but an even more important influence was
political forces operating independently of environmental policy pur
poses.
Federal agencies have been preoccupied with NEPA's environ
mental impact statement requirement since the law's enactment.
However, NEPA contains a number of other substantial provisions
for the achievement of its purposes which have not yet been tested.
CEQ, for instance, could issue tougher and more explicit guidelines
concerning overall implementation of NEPA and link EIS's to the
achievement of NEPA's substantive policies. While CEQ lacks the
authority to veto agency actions, its guidelines would undoubtedly
be treated as important tests in subsequent judicial decisions. Law
suits could be based on other provisions of NEPA, such as failure to
develop procedures for appropriate consideration of unquantifiable
values, promotion of imbalance between population and resource
use, or degradation of the quality of renewable resources.
The most important failure of NEPA so far is not the attenuation
of its tactical mechanisms for forcing action in individual cases, but
the rarity of its influence upon truly major federal decisions at the
policy, programmatic, and legislative levels. The enactment of NEPA
was an attempt to bring about administrative change by changes in
procedures, and it may yet prove to have achieved some enduring
success. However, such success should probably be attributed to the
maintenance of political forces that have been engendered by the Act
and the prevalent climate of environmental and related values, not to
the direct effect of NEPA procedures on agency activities.

53. See Downs, Up and Down with Ecology: The "Issue-Attention Cycle," The Public
Interest, Summer 1972, 38-50; and M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (1968).

